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ON SEEING WHAT IS NOT THERE 
by Virgil C. A ldrich 
Santayana said, "Nothing given exists." One thinks of jokes right away. 
A Volkswagen is given you as a commencement gift. Nothing given exists. 
Therefore, qua given, your car is nonexistent, and you can say thanks for 
nothing to the giver. But, as some philosophers still remind us, ordinary terms 
may be used in an extraordinary way or in prescribed applications in the 
treatment of philosophical problems. "Given" here is subject to such use, and 
we must understand it that way if we are doing philosophy. In  this particular 
essay, I am wholly in favor of doing just that, since I think the result, arrived 
at my way, will put the concept of "intentional object" in a new light, espe- 
cially as applied to objects of visual perception. My essay is to be a speculative 
improvisation on the ambiguous notion of the "myth of the givenv-the 
notion that no such thing exists-conceding something to it, but in a way that 
pulls the rug out from under those who currently maintain it. 
How, then, is Santayana's statement to be construed, playing his 
language-game? What is this "given" that, by nature, is nonexistent? In visual 
experience, it is a (determinate) universal, an essence, simple or conlplex, 
and universals, as such, subsist only. They do not exist. There are givens, but 
to be does not entail to exist. When the material conditions are right, a 
universal ("essence") supervenes in the field of visual consciousness, is imme- 
diately "intuited," and taken (or mistaken) as a sign of a state of affairs among 
existing particulars. Thus what is given in the field of your visual perception 
of, say, the woman you love, is a wraith-a Iovely apparition of the existing 
particular female you take it to characterize. It is nevertheless a bona fide 
object of visual "intuition," though nonexistent. And you may have fallen 
in love withjust that-as will dawn on you when you find out that your dream 
woman is not the one with the m-predicates: the one that exists and you live 
and sleep with. After aI1, "love" is, in our more recent lingo, an intentional 
verb. You can love what does not exist. Santayana said, in effect, that "see" 
is an intentional verb. But he was more than underwriting the weak notion 
that sonzetin?es what one sees is not really there (existent). His point was that 
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what we simply or directly see never exists-or what is given to visual intuition 
is never "out there," since an essence, a universal, is never anywhere or any- 
when, as such. Whitehead's notion of "eternal object" is quite like this one, 
since, by his own admission, he conceived it under Santayana's influence. 
The above is one analysis of the idea of the "sense datum." It differs radi- 
cally from the psychological analysis of the given into sensations. Let us see 
how a theorist who espouses this view might use the dictum that nothing given 
exists. Of course, if it is dualistic, the theory has no use for it. Sensations, 
on that view, are mental particulars, existing "alongside'~heparticu1ar neural 
states correlated with them. But, with the advent of a reductionist identity- 
theory, a sensation, in the psychological sense, was analyzed out of existence 
into a material state of affairs. Then, if you hang on to the old notion that 
only sensations are sense-data ("given" to sense), or the only immediate 
givens, it follows that nothing given exists. As Thomas Hobbes said, they are 
"phantasms" that only appear to exist. Such reasoning, however, gets its 
apparent force by playing tricks with language-strata-what Dray has called 
a jumping from one semantic level to another. Here there is no recourse to 
the neo-Platonic notion of "logical" entities that, as determinate universals, 
only subsist, nowhere in space-time-a kind of logical atomism, as applied 
in the analysis of the data of visual perception. Bertrand Russell also once 
held such a view. At least he gave it a good try, as he did the other positions 
he subsequently took and forsook. 
There is a significant point on which the logical and the psychological views 
ofsense-data abovementioned agree. Sense-data are "private" to the individ- 
ual "having" or "intuiting" them. Strictly speaking, what is given to one 
cannot, in principle, be given to another, partly because the objective and 
the subjective conditions of the sense-datum's appearance, as intuited or had, 
can never be identical in the two cases. So, access to the given, whether it 
be taken to be a universal or a mental particular, is privileged. The individual 
alone has the privilege. This suggests that the expression "the given" or "what 
is given7' is incomplete. The completed expression reads: "given to S," where 
S is a particular someone or subject of the immediate experience. So the 
tendency here is to agree aIso that such experiences are incorrigible. They 
cannot go wrong because they "take" nothing beyond the private given to 
be the case. 
Let us see, next, what might be made of our maxim, "nothing given exists," 
by one who philosophizes in the style of continental phenomenology, Hus- 
serl's theory being an arch example. The central idea of this view is that all 
consciousness is intentional. This, being interpreted, means that conscious- 
ness never "naturalIyn terminates in the simply given. This implies that 
no natural perceptual awareness is immediate. It always has an "objective" 
beyond what is directly intuited, if anything. And this dictum, in turn, is 
susceptible of two different interpretations. One is the more traditional line 
ON SEEING WHAT IS NOT THERE 17 
such as was taken by Santayana. There is something given, though subsistent 
only like an essence which one becomes aware of by "bracketing" conscious- 
ness off from its natural objectives. The other interpretation is the newer 
that is closer to Husserl, and to the phenomenologists after him. In this 
view, "nothing given exists" is not allowed to yield "but there are givens that 
don't exist." It reads, rather, "Anything, qua given to or in consciousness, 
is only inexistentially present," or "Nothing, qua existent, is ever simply given 
in or to consciousness," or for the visual case, "No existing thing is ever simply 
seen, thanks just to good eyesight, if by such vision is meant sight that is not 
structured (directed, aimed) by intentions; there simply is no such seeing." 
In John Dewey's words, the given is always taken to be something 
"present-as-absent." 
This is the now-famous notion of "intentional inexistence," with its impli- 
cation that nobody ever simply sees anything. Different recent versions of 
it are due to Chisholm, Anscombe, and others. Frequently, under Kant's 
influence, the idea is, given a conceptual twist, to the effect that, if not inten- 
tions, then anyway concepts must come into play to present even the simplest 
visual experience with objects of sight-the theory then being that, to get at 
anything "objectively there," one has to think or believe that something is 
the case. Thus is all seeing made "epistemic," an embryonic conceptual 
enterprise. The thrust of this whole styIe of theorizing about all states of 
consciousness purporting to have objects is the attempt to Show that "exis- 
tence" is-in Santayana's excellent phrase-a surd quantity, surd because 
neither perception nor conception, singly or jointly, simplygives the existence 
of anything inparticular-or then and there in the particular case. What seems 
to be given there and then is, if existence is in question, an affair for nonter- 
minating judgments to deal with, as C. I. Lewis said-endless inferences 
required by the implicit implications of theory-laden terms even in the sim- 
plest perceptual reports, such as of something that made you see it by con- 
spicuously and determinately appearing in your visual field whether you were 
looking for it or not, and whether or not you know what it is. Just to notice 
it is to believe something about it and thus to get caught in a conceptual 
spiderweb. 
I call philosophical funsterism the style of thinking that results in, and is 
content to rest the case about perception on, such a conclusion (the funster 
in philosophy is nothing ifnot startling). The workers in philosophy are those 
who are restive about this, and do what they can to justify the less theatrical 
view of the matter, not by appeals to common sense orjust to ordinary use 
of ordinary terms, but by arguments, some conceptually well-formed, others 
impressively persuasive without such construction. Frank Sibley, Dretske, 
Warnock, Arthur Collins, Ryle, Austin, Merleau-Ponty, and even Wittgen- 
stein in his ambiguous way, have done some work in this direction, but with- 
out overwhelming success. A more successful job at this requires first a more 
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radical categorial reconstruction from the ground up, a more critical look at 
ultimate presuppositions, or what Aristotle called "startingpoints." From this 
treatment a new concept of intentional objects will emerge, one that applies 
nicely even to the objects just of good eyesight, thanks to a much needed 
modification of what the intentionalists (and conceptualists) have in mind, 
So you can see that I am, in part, going to play their language-game, which 
should show that I am not wholesale against this ancient and still viable style 
of philosophical thinking. Before making my own splash by dropping the 
coin into this wishing well, let me first examine Gilbert Ryle's performance 
as a would-be worker, not a funster, in philosophy, in the theory of visual 
perception. Since Sibleyl has gone with a fine tooth comb through Ryle's 
remarks on seeing or observing in The Concept of Mind, I shall attend mainly 
to things Ryle said some four years later in Dilemnzas, in the essay on percep- 
tion. This brief look at Ryle wiIl set the stage for my own bit of descriptive 
metaphysics bearing on the notion of simply seeing something, with special 
concern for the description of wlzat is thusseen-the question that Ryle himself 
tends to neglect in favor of the seeing. 
Of seeing itself, Ryle wisely says in his earlier work (p. 232) that it is using 
one's eyes, not using one's sensations as clues or evidence; and that learning 
to see is like learning to ride a bicycle, not an affair of clapping concepts 
on the seen things. This at least suggests that sight is a physiological affair, 
but in his later work Ryle explicitly denies this. There he says that seeing, 
say, a tree is neither a physiological nor a psychological "phenomenon." "It 
is not a phenomenon at all" (pp. 101-102). So it is neither objectively obser- 
vable nor a private mental affair to be subjectively introspected. 
One who talks this way is evidently bending over backwards both from 
sense-datum theories of perception on the one hand and Watsonian beha- 
viorism on the other, and one can like him for doing this, or at least under- 
stand why he did it. There are reasons. But Ryle's remark is too blunderbuss 
a blast. It shoots holes into something that one does not want perforated. 
Of course, one may be glad to have the old act-theories of seeing damaged, 
whether of the brain-event sort that puts seeing behind the eyes, or of the 
mental-occurrence sort which makes of seeing an inner "diaphanous" act that 
eludes introspection even by the mind staging it (G. E. Moore). This all on 
the side of seeing. But how about what is seen-the thing simply as an object 
of good eyesight, looking somehow to the seer? Is this not a phenomenon 
in some straightforward sense, something simply appearing in the field of 
vision and seen, whether as a result of a hunt or investigation, or as innocently 
antecedent to any expectation, interpretation, explanation, or evaluation? 
Anyway, this is the "phenomenon" that is my primary concern from here 
on, the target of my bit of descriptive metaphysics. Age-old questions and 
answers have clustered around the notion, and I shall here add yet another 
answer-the right one, of course. Ryle himself does not dwell on it, because 
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of his "perception-recipe"-and-achievement concept of seeing, which makes 
it a close neighbor to, if not identical with, "seeing-that." (This conceptualist 
twist shows itself more clearly in the later treatment.) And, of course, the 
object of such seeing is indeed "not a phenomenon at all," being too proposi- 
tional to be the sort of direct object that "see" takes in its simple use. 
The notion of "intentional" verbs ("wanting," for example) has of late been 
spelled out in a variety of ways, sometimes with the help of the schema (S 
v 0 and 0 is P) implies (S v P). Where the verb is intentional, the implication 
is said to fail as a basis for inference. For example, if Oedipus wanted to 
kill that man, and the man was his father, it does not follow that he wanted 
to kill his father. Anyway, insofar as this is true-there is room for a different 
construction, as Quine pointed out-"want" is branded an intentional verb. 
"See," in some of its uses, is not quite like this. One might naturally say that 
Oedipus "saw" his father at that t~agic encounter, not knowing that the man 
he saw was his father. Here, S sees 0 and 0 is P yields S sees P. Similarly, 
the hawk-eyed woodsman who, in the laboratory, sees that shiny elongated 
thing sees (unknowingly) an X-ray tube, since that is what it is. Again, this 
is debatable (remember Hanson), but insofar as there is such a use of "see," 
it is more like "step on" and "eat," so is not intentional. Thus, as Dretske 
says, seeing a bug is like stepping on it. You may even do this unawares, 
or without any particular belief about the object. If S sees 0 in this sense, 
0 must exist. 
But, from here on, I want to make hay mainly out of a different sort of 
case. If S sees a star, and the star is a swarm of atoms, does S see a swarm 
of atoms? And to be able to squeeze all the juice out of this orange, I shall 
first have to come to terms with yet another sort of (though related) case: 
if S sees a bright speck up there in the night sky, and the speck is a star, 
does S see a star? This two-stage approach will clear the deck for making 
a new sort of sense of the notion of "intentional object," as the "phenomenon" 
that amounts to "what is simply seen" by anyone with good eyesight. This 
then is the quarry; let us proceed to zero in on it. The old notions of intentional 
verbs and their objects qua intentionaI were introduced to account primarily 
for cases of "seeing" what is not "there"-cases in which a material object 
description of what is seen turns out to be false. My new treatment of these 
notions will allow for mistakes-in two logically different ways-even about 
what is simply seen, qua intentional object. Moreover, it will show why 
neither "physical" ("physiological," etc.) nor "psychological" ("mental," etc.) 
nicely apply, as categorial predicates, to the phenomenon of simply seeing 
something-neither to such "seeing" in this bipolar concept, nor to what is 
thus seen. Ryle, Sibley," and others who recognize this fact need to be helped 
over the embarrassment about it. The new maneuver will also show another 
application of the dictum, "nothing given exists," yielding a fresh insight into 
the notion of the intentionality of sight and its objects. 
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To set the stage for the main show, let me give you a picture which you 
do not have to take seriously at first. And, at first, look at it as innocently 
as you can, for the sake of an impression thatpreconceptions tend to preclude. 
Conceptions and preconceptions can become operative again later on-in 
their usual constructive and destructive ways. 
The picture is of a source of light. When it is on, or turned on, the things 
in its neighborhood are in its field of illumination. They are illuminated by 
the source. They, and the field of illumination, are around the source. Neither 
is in the source of light. 
Among these things is a sleeping man. When the light-source is turned 
on, he is awakened, which is what it is for him to be turned on. For him to 
be turned on, or awake with eyes opened, is for the things before him in his 
neighborhood to be in his field of visual consciousness, which he would not 
have were he not a living thing with a nervous system including eyes. The 
things are seen by him. This visual field that extends before his eyes, and 
the things seen in it, are not in him, the seer. They are in that portion of 
the field of illumination that has come alive as a field of vision. And as the 
things in the field are iIluminated on their sides that face the source of light, 
so are they seen on the side that faces the point of view. The far side is "in 
the dark," both in the sense of "out of sight" and "out of light," if the thing 
is opaque. ("Opaque" has a Latin root that means dark or shady. Neither 
light nor sight can penetrate an opaque thing, which therefore leaves some- 
thing in the dark on the far side in the one sense or the other.) 
But the luminous source, shining upon or-if it is transparent-through a 
thing in its field of illumination, does something to that thing, as it did to 
the man when it awakened him, turned him on; whereas the seer, simply 
seeing the thing, or through it, is not doing anything to it. The thing does 
indeed, qua seen, become an "object of sighto-what is seen-in the visual 
field where it is made to appear to the seer. But there is no causal efficacy 
of sight in this, acting on the thing. Quite to the contrary, the thing, by thus 
being "objectified" (expressed) for a subject of visual experience, is presented 
as a phenomenon, an appearance, the very existence-if any-of which is in 
some sense problematic. This is to say that the thing, by becoming an object 
of sight, has suffered a sort of annihilation, a de-entification. As what is simply 
seen, it is neither a something nor a nothing. It is loosened from its status 
in the executive order of things that exist. Though it is indeed luminously 
there to be seen by anyone with good eyesight, it is, as an object for a subject, 
not existentially present. And the "consciousness" that is involved in this is 
not a state of mind. Or, learning simply to see is an affair of eyes maturing 
with use, eventually focusing on nonconceptually structured phenomena in 
that part of the field of illumination that has come alive as the field of visual 
consciousness. At its minimum that is what vision is. The organization of its 
objects, as such, is not the work of mind. 
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Here I draw the curtain over this picture, and continue the investigation 
in a vein that makes more sense to philosophers with conceptually hardened 
arteries like yours and mine. 
You remember the remark made earlier about two logically distinct ways 
in which one can go wrong about "phenomena," which is from here on our 
new word for intentional objects. A phenomenon or intentional object is, in 
the visual case, a thing in the role of object of sight-something appearing in 
a certain way to a seer, thanks to light and responsive eyes and other related 
conditions that objectify or "express" it in his field of visual consciousness. 
Notice here the nonequivalence of "thing" and "object"; a thing is an object 
only under certain conditions, vis-5-vis a subject, Remember Descartes' old 
use of "objective," according to which a thing objectified-or as present to 
a subject-is a thing subjectified, thus relativized. This is simply to recognize 
"object" and "subject7' as the grammatical and logical correlatives that they 
are, reserving "thing" for the more neutral or logically primitive use. 
One way in which the seer makes mistakes about phenomena-objects of 
sight-has to do with what, in general, are called conditions of visibiIity. And 
this is what one is to have in mind in turning now to deal with the seeing-the- 
speck-and-star case. 
It is natural enough to speak of seeing a star as a bright speck in the night 
sky, but this use of "seeing-as" is different both from what Wittgenstein made 
of the notion and from what the conceptualists do with it. Wittgenstein had 
in mind schematic figures that can be simply seen not to be what they are 
seen as, like the duck-rabbit picture, seen as a rabbit or a duck, without 
mistake. The conceptualists' point is kin to Kant's, to the effect that any 
phenomenon of perception ("experience") is there to be perceived thanks to 
the mind's constructive (conceptual) work on the otherwise unformed sensory 
manifold. In short, for him objects of sight ("phenomena") are, from the 
ground up, already in the realm of mind-though, as he tried to show, not 
in the sense of, say, Berkeley's "subjective idealism." Kant's point is, simply, 
that percepts without concepts are blind, or have no objects at all. Without 
concepts, one sees nothing at all. But, clearly, what is expressed by "seeing 
stars as specks" is not a conceptual achievement, referring as it does to 
phenonzena that set the stage for conceptualization. 
Of course, one could take the expression the other way around: seeing a 
bright speck in a dark field as a star. This might suggest lcnowing what one 
sees, or having found something out about it by investigation; say, that it 
is really a large hot body at an enormous distance, or a hole in an opaque 
spherical shell with light outside, or a quintessential intelligence. This would 
be to "see that" what you simply see is that sort of thing. But even this misses 
the sense of "star" in which people, looking up into the night sky, have from 
the beginning simply seen the stars and wondered what they were, how far 
away, etc., since the conditions of visibility of a star are too poor to show 
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them the answers to this. "Star," thus ostensively defined, is what people, 
at any time in any clime, simply see at night, and then speculate about- 
goaded on to do this especially in the stellar case precisely because craning 
the neck this way and that, or getting closer or stepping back, or moving 
around what is seen, is either not feasible or does not yield a better look at 
the thing. 
For such phenomena (objects of sight) that are too far outside the zone 
of stereoscopic vision to permit the seer to take a good look at them, or too 
large and bright and hot to permit a good look at them from close up, it makes 
sense to say that they are seen as this or that, where the question of what 
visible properties the thing "really" has, is left partly open by the description 
even of the appearance. And, of course, it is under such poor conditions of 
visibility that the seer may make a mistake. And the notion of "intentional 
object" in this context means that vision there is not, or cannot be, consum- 
mated. A good Iook is not feasible here, but relevant to the kind of question 
being asked. 
It is crucially important to understand how a mistake in such a context 
is corrected, because this determines the sense of mistake here being exam- 
ined. This is illustrated by another case, in which an eventual good look at 
the thing is both relevant and feasible. Suppose there are, in a green field, 
a white circular disk (plate) and a white ball side by side a hundred yards 
from the point of view. Each is a foot in diameter, and the disk is at right 
angles to the line of sight. They look exactly alike to the seer, because at that 
distance he simply cannot see-or cannot simply see-the shape of the two 
surfaces that face him. This shape is a visual determinable, not a determinate, 
in those circumstances. This is to say that the conditions of objectification 
of the disk and the ball in the seer's visual field are such as to leave out of 
sight their frontal shapes, while the circular profiles are given. As simply seen, 
these things appear neither flat nor convex on the sides facing the seer. He 
simply can't see the frontal surfaces. 
In  such circumstances, the seer may indeed say he can see either one as 
a disk or as a ball-philosophers talk this way about the moon looking flat 
or round-all this in Wittgenstein's sense, since what is given is schematic 
enough to make room for a sort of seeing-as. But it is precisely such a use 
of "seeing as" that is crowded out if the seer moves closer and looks at the 
things at a distance of six feet from the point of view. Then, simply seeing 
the flat disk, he cannot make sense of seeing the disk "as flat" or "as convex" 
any more than he can of seeing it as white or red. Wittgenstein was right 
about this, where the conditions of visibility are too good to leave room for 
such impressionistic seeing or to provide illocutionary space for really using 
the locution "seeing as" that is just right only for schematic figures. 
So, the first way in which a mistake may be made about visible phenom- 
ena-things as objectified in a visual field-is related to situations (contexts) 
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in which the decision rests with visual perception, or in which the notion of 
dGobjective" conditions of visibility-including eyesight-has a key role. A 
mistake here would mean a taking ("believing") something that is not 4 to 
be 4 where 4 is a visible characteristic and the thing seen does not show but 
suggests 4 under the given conditions of visibility of the 4 in question, to 
anyone with good eyesight. What induces such a mistake is, of course, the 
seer's simply seeing something that is not clearly objectified in the circum- 
stances and reacting as if it were 4 -or as if this is what could and would 
be simply seen under a good look at it. 
Crucial also is the reminder that "belief," in this context, is not yet a mental 
&air (Ryle). Guesswork, on this level, is more an affair of having learned 
to see and an exercise of the capacity. The developed or adult seer is one 
who can tell, simply from trying to see, whether or not he can see the item 
in question. His complaining that he cannot see the frontal shape from a 
hundred yards off is not the expression of a belief that the conditions are 
wrong for such seeing. By the same token, he neither believes nor disbe- 
lieves-knows or does not know-that the objective conditions are right for 
dependable seeing when he moves up to six feet away for the decisive look 
and the final report. Dretske and Sibley were wrong about this."eeing is 
izot believing of that sort, even when it is revealing in this elementary way. 
These cases ofvisual determinables-items appearing indeterminately 
under certain visibility conditions-are different from cases like, say, the stick 
clearly seen but partly submerged in clear, still water, or things clearly seen 
in a mirror. The former "vague" cases are logically connected in part with 
the question of acute eyesight, the latter mainly with optical conditions of 
light and media in the field clearly "before one's eyeso-seeing things that 
are not there in the direction the eyes are turned. I cannot deal with this 
important distinction in this essay-except again to remind you that the ques- 
tion of the "order" of things simply seen in the field of light-and-sight is not 
a question of how the field is conceptualized. And I must now say something 
more about this before proceeding to the account of the other (logically dif- 
ferent) way in which one makes mistakes about phenomena, or about what 
we simply see-which account is going to put the notion of "intentionaI objects 
of sight" into a context that makes it philosophically more interesting, So 
far, the concept of intentional objects has been pretty much confined to 
meaning what we simply see when we are not seeing as acutely as we are 
able to. The intentionality of objects seen thus is the tug built into them towards 
consummated seeing-sometimes feasible, sometimes not. For such cases, the 
decision, if any, rests in principle with perception. 
But, now, what about the claim that the field of simple vision is structured, 
but not "conceptually"? When the seer reports what he sees, howsoever 
simply, is he not applying concepts? Surely, saying something even as simple 
as, "This is flat and white," involves the concepts of white and flat. Thus, 
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you cannot use language at all without conceptualizing what you are talking 
about. 
This certainly must be granted. But then a distinction becomes crucially 
important between two logically different orders of concepts or ways of using 
terms of the language. The first are such that the question of whether or not 
they apply to the given thing is answered by taking a good look at it-an 
intersubjective procedure that anyone with good eyesight can engage in, 
where the conditions of visibility make it feasible. People do not have private 
and privireged access to phenomena, even as intentional objects of uncon- 
summated vision. (Step over here to where I stand, and you will see and fail 
to see what I see and fail to see, if your eyesight matches mine.) Now, I call 
"plain talk" the use of language that is "centripetal" around phenomena or 
perceived things. This is to say that the meaning and the justifiability of what 
gets said are determined by reference to what is publicly there to be seen, 
or to things simply as objects of sight, since its terms were learned in their 
visible presence. What this denies is the "centrifugal" theory of language that 
makes it look as if anything said is like the basket hanging from a balloon, 
where the balloon is a theory or a conceptual system qua theoretical, deter- 
mining from above the "direction" (sense, intention) and adequacy of any- 
thing that is said, even the so-called descriptions. This monolithic view of 
language makes in effect all of its terms theoretical and "explanatory" in any 
use, tending thus to replace perception with theory-laden conception, from 
the ground up. What is wrong with this will be shown as we get into the 
analysis of the second way of making mistakes about things as phenomenal 
(intentional) objects of sight. What has been suggested here about "plain 
talk" is a "first" order of concepts-presupposed by the second-with which 
one can describe and explain things in a theoretically innocent way. "Why 
is this woman weeping? During the earthquake, a wall fell and buried her 
child under the debris. How do you know? I saw it happen." Sherlock Holmes 
thought and spoke in this idiom expertly, without acquiring any reputation 
at all for theory-construction in the conceptual system-building sense. Nor 
was he, in his performance as a detective, unwittingly using some special 
conceptual system which prevailed at the time. This is why achievements of 
first-order thinking "have no history." They are, in Strawson's words, at the 
"massive central core" presupposed by the theories that do have a history, 
at the periphery of that matrix situation in which plain talk serves so nicely 
and so unostentatiously. 
To say that such plain talk consists of unclear bits of embryonic theorizing 
is not only too counter-intuitive for words. It is a logical howler, for one who 
understands the logic of plain talk. Of course, to deny this is fun, being the 
opening wedge either for scepticism or science-fiction philosophy. This is why 
there are philosophical funsters and we like some of them around-some of 
the time. For example, what the funsters says about sight implies, in effect, 
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that seeing a cat streak throught the backyard (chased by a dog) is logically 
like seeing an alpha particle streak through the Wilson cloud chamber. This 
puts both reports of what is seen into the same logical boat. The meaning 
and justification of both are dependent on a theory, and it is this maneuver 
that makes "object of sight" continuous-if not simply identical-with "object 
of thought," the latter notion being made to wear the trousers. 
So I turn, at last, to the second way of making mistakes about what we 
see, and to the sense of "seeing what is not there" (intentional object) in that 
context, The first way does involve concepts, as has been noticed, but that 
sort of conceptualization is not fundamentally responsible for the order 
(structure) of things to which they apply, or for mistakes about them. This 
distinguishes them from the second case'now before us, where to make a 
mistake about phenomena is, fundamentally, to misconceive them, in the 
sense of a failure in theorizing about them. Here, the notion of ''conceptual 
organization" of phenomena applies nicely, meaning a putative order con- 
ceived to explain, ex hypothesi, the perceived regular correlations given in 
the perceptua1 field. The aim here is, in short, to give the why and the how 
of regularities expressed in first-order empirical generalizations. 
But what I want to focus on is the different complexion that the notion 
of "intentional objects of sight" has in this context of second-order concep- 
tualization. You will remember that we began by wondering about the idea 
that nothing given exists, and have introduced "phenomena" as what are 
given in the field of visual consciousness-things as objectified (relativized 
that non-conceptual way) for sight in the field of illumination. These we have 
called "real," meaning what they are as objects of consummated vision-or 
under a good look at them, and in this first case, their intentionality consisted 
in what it is in them that prompts a better look when the visibility conditions 
are not so good. But in the second-order case, now before us, there is a dif- 
ference. It is illustrated by the difference between the star that is a luminous 
speck and the star that is a cluster of atoms. Seeing the star, does one see 
the cluster of elements that it actually is? The negative answer, which offhand 
seems right, implies that in simply looking at the star, you simply see what 
is not there, or you do not see what 'kctually" is there, and this drives home 
the thesis of the intentionality of what is seen, in a different dimension of 
sense. The difference is that, in this case, the "more to seeing than meets the 
eye" is not what would determinately appear (be seen) under a good look 
as in the flat disk case. The more to seeing than meets the eye, in the 
second-order case, is logically different, if "seeing" is here conflated with 
'%theorizing," or "thinking that," making "what is seen" equivalent to "object 
of thought" (a theoretical entity). Of course, that is more than simply meets 
the clammy, unthinking little thing called the eye-so goes the story-the 
exercise of which organ of sight is, in this context, a symbol of simpleminded- 
ness taken in by mere apparitions, sometimes called "experiences." The sug- 
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gestion by the funsters is that, in all visual cases, what does simply meet the 
eye is like the dagger that Macbeth "saw," which has suggested that simply 
seeing has no actual objects at all, ever, and seeing without objects is not seeing 
at all. Seeing must be more mindful than that, to grasp anything that is 
actually there to be seen. Shades of PIato and Descartes!. 
The poison in this suggestion is extracted by allowing for phenomena as 
things which are intersubjectively objectified for vision and plain talk, in the 
first-order sense sketched above, where visual consummations and decisions 
based on them are feasible without theories. But for language-users, "sight" 
is a bipolar concept. At one end, it gravitates around the concept of good 
eyesight and plain talk (first-order). At the other, it amounts to theoretical 
vision. This is putative knowledge whose objects are theoretical entities, the 
formulation (theory) of which accounts generally for the order of things 
simply seen. Consummation of such theory-laden vision involves conclusive 
theoretical considerations that warrant a knowledge-claim, such that here the 
decision rests only obliquely and partially on first-order perception. 
But there is still this new (second-order) sense of "intentional object of 
sight" that, in this context, has not yet been elucidated. Looking at the star 
that actually is a cluster of atoms, but not knowing this, what do I see? One 
might answer either (1) nothing or (2) something that doesn't exist, or (3) 
something that does exist but is objectified for the seer in a way that does 
not show him what it actually is, in its existence (or existentially speaking). 
Examine these three answers. (1) The answer that simply nothing is seen 
follows from taking "see" to mean "know" (theory-laden seeing). Then, given 
that the seer knows nothing of the actual atomic composite that the star is, 
he sees (knows) nothing. To say the least, he does not see the star, where 
"star" means "cluster of atoms." Few people, if any, have consistently and 
wholly hung on to this "sees nothing" answer. 
(2) The answer that, loolung at a star, I see something that does not exist, 
reminds one of the dagger that Macbeth saw or seemed to see. What is wrong 
with this is the suggestion that all seeing is hallucination, including the good 
look from close up at the flat white disk, since that too is a cluster of atoms. 
This obliterates an important difference. Only Macbeth could "see" the dag- 
ger. You, and anyone else with good eyesight, can see the star that I see, and 
that deflates the balloon of the hallucination theory of vision. Anyway, people 
do not normally think and talk that way about all objects of sight-for what- 
ever that is worth. 
(3) The answer, in terms of an existing something that appears in a way 
that does not reveal what is here in question about it is the easing-not the 
easy-answer. And the question here is precisely the sort that only theoretical 
considerations can answer, not better looks (first-order) at the thing. To "see" 
the remote star or the nearby disk, here meaning things that are clusters of 
atoms, is tosee that they are things ofthat sort, and such (second-order) seeing 
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is indeed theory-laden. It is knowing (seeing) something that simply seeing 
things is, in principle, mute about. (And, conversely, if it is a first-order ques- 
tion about the thing-is that a ball or a disk a hundred yards off?-theory-laden 
seeingis out of order, irrelevant. One moves closer for the good, decisive look.) 
I have associated a question's being theoretical with its being a question 
about what exists or the "actual" nature of things "in their existence," And 
these things, I have said, appear under nonconceptual conditions of "objec- 
tification" for vision, as the "phenomena" that anyone with good eyesight 
can see and be articulate about in the first-order concepts of plain talk. And 
I have characterized phenomena as things that are "really" there for public 
encounter in the field of visual consciousness, which is not a state of mind 
but a field of illumination "come alive." 
Now I want to say that simply seen phenomena-the "real" objects of that 
sort of seeing-do not, as such, exist (which indeed is to put "exist" to a 
restrictive use) and I say that all such objects are "actual" existing things 
"inexistentially present" in the field of visual experience. This is the 
second-order sense of "intentional objects of sight." In the first-order case, 
the intentionality of the objects of sight meant the lure in them towards better 
looks at them. Visual consummations of this sort show what and where things 
as phenomena "really" are, in the logically primitive or first order use of 
"where" and "what." I am restricting "real" or "really" to apply to what is 
found out to be the case this way. Such realities are not subjective ghosts 
that will be liquidated by theories, since such being as they have is not 
theory-dependent. They are at the "massive central core that has no history," 
meaning no history of the sort that theories have. And Anscombe's "gram- 
matical feature" notion' of the intentionality of these objects is not sufficient 
to explain such independence. 
In the second-order case, the intentionaIity of the objects of sight is the 
lure in them towards theoretical understanding of what and where they 
"actually" are in their existence-or the lure in them that provokes the 
language-user (and only language-users) into theorizing about them. In this 
light, what is simply given in the visual field is looked upon wholesale as 
not actual& there, in favor of what can be found out about it by theorizing. 
Plato recognized only this sense of "intentional object of sight," thus suggest- 
ing that in simply seeing something (first-order), one sees either nothing, or 
something that does not truly exist. Such a maneuver leaves out the objective 
reality of what is simply seen, with which omission the monolithic centrifugal 
theory of thought and language, currently the style with philosophers like 
Goodman and Quine and Putnam, has a field day. In this view, nothing is 
"realIy there," in a theory-independent way, as a check on theories. The 
Bacchanalian revel that results is essentially Hegelian, as some critics of the 
movement are beginning to find and to point out-and some proponents to 
admit. 
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In conclusion, I must do something to take some of the mystery out of my 
central notion of the "field" of sight-and-light, in which actual existing things 
are objectified, under conditions of visibility, for simple visual encounter by 
the seer, or in which they are really but not existentially present, as is the 
seer himself, qua seer. If I do this adequately, I will, with the same stroke, 
also explain the remark made earlier that simply seeing something in this 
field is neither a physical (physiological) nor a mental (psychological) affair 
(phenomenon), as Ryle, Sibley, even Anscombe have suggested. This suggests 
a tertium quid, a third somewhat, which is what finally is to be spelled out. 
When you look at a Kathe Kollwitz sketch of a grieving woman and see 
it as a grieving woman, what do you see? Do you see the sketch? Do you 
see a grieving woman? The careful (qualified) answers will be negative. If you 
look at the schematic picturing device and strictly see it, the report of what 
you see will certainly be different from the report of what you see it as. But 
neither will you simply see a grieving woman, since your eyes are certainly 
not directed at a grieving woman, but rather at the picture. 
What you see when you see the picture as a grieving woman is not really 
there (a special kind of intentional object). Still, it is not quite right to say 
that you see nothing, or even that you see something that is unreal. There 
really are grieving women, and one of these might even have sat for the 
picture. Why not say that a grieving woman is "present" or "presented" in 
the space of the picture (as its "content") but not really there? Or that the 
picture "comes alive" with what it re-presents, i.e., with the "unreal presence" 
of what it pictures? 
Notice also that the report of what you see the sketch as-the unreal pres- 
ence of something in it-will not be in terms of what you think or even imag- 
ine. It will be a report of what you see, in some bona fide sense of the term, 
granting, of course, that there will be special conditions of "objectification" 
of this special sort. Moreover, notice that the space of what is seen "in" the 
picture is not the space of the sketch itself or the space in which you find 
the real originals (models). 
The scene changes. Instead of our seeing the sketch of a grieving woman 
as a grieving woman, you are there in the green field looking at the flat white 
disk at a distance of six feet. What do you see? This time it is the "real" thing. 
But this still leaves out of thepicture-the word is chosen advisedly-the thing 
the disk actually is in its existence, say, a conglomeration of atoms. You do 
not simply see that, as you did not see a real woman in the first case, looking 
at the sketch that "objectified" her for you in the special pictorial way that 
defines a work of art. 
I am giving birth to the idea of an objectification of sorts occurring, this 
time a bedrock, natural sort of picturing, in simply seeing the real thing, where 
this "real" is the tertium quid, corresponding to what was expressed, shown, 
seen "in" the sketch. So, what is simply seen in the natural picture is in a 
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new sense neither a something nor a nothing, though "objectively" there to 
be seen. And the space of the field of visual consciousness in which it appears 
is not simply the space of the existing, actual, original "in itself," the colloca- 
tion of atoms, as the space of the thing apparent in the Kollwitz sketch is 
not the thing's space in reality. 
The analogy can be pressed further. In the primordial case of objectifica- 
tion of existing things for simple vision, with its natural conditions, there is 
( I )  a sketching, (2) the resulting sketch, and (3) what is sketched (the original). 
(1) The sketching is the play of light schematically depicting at least the form 
of the original on the retina, via the lens of the eye. (2) The inverted image 
is the sketch, picturing (3) the existing collocation of atoms. Thus is the natu- 
ral stage set for simply seeing something. But what is thus simply seen is 
neither the ocular sketch (retinal image) not the atomic conglomerate in its 
physical space. It is rather the visual phenomenon that takes shape in the 
"real" space of the natural picture, its "content," which here is the field of 
visual consciousness. And, I submit, this phenomenon-the real object that 
you are visually awakened (turned on) to in this situation-is the actual atomic 
thing inexistentially present in the visual field, challenging (luring) you to 
get at what and where it "actually" is, by theoretical considerations of the 
sort that were not at all necessary to your being aware of its real presence 
in the field of visual consciousness. 
Here the analogy with pictorial (artful) representation as we ordinarily 
understand it ends. In the latter case, the seer can come out of the seeing-as 
experience of the "content" of the sketch to look at and see the sketch itself, 
and to see that, in certain respects such as shape, etc., it is roughly like what 
it represents-also to look at and see the (original) real thing "the like of 
which" is expressed (shown) in the picture. Nothing like this is feasible in 
the bedrock natural case of the picturing that goes on in simply seeing some- 
thing, in the context of the question of what actually exists and its nature. 
Nobody can simply see either his retinal image or the cluster of atoms it 
corresponds to (a grammatical remark). Of course, both are atomic con- 
glomerates in the final physical analysis, so neither is in the real (perceptual) 
space of the phenomenal representation that is simply seen. Thus, this 
bedrock seeing, though it involves picturing, is something that just happens 
willy-nilly to the seer by nature's instigation; she has constituted him that 
way, naturally to picture (express) in the visual field the ambient actualities. 
Whereas, looking at and seeing the Kollwitz sketch as a grieving woman is 
sophisticated enough to count as something the seer does, his action-some- 
times even voluntary. So it presupposes linguistic and mental capabilities and 
techniques, which make certain predicates associated with these appropriate 
to its description and explanation. Not so with simply becoming visually 
aware of something just on the strength of good eyesight. Nature does that 
to one, making him see what is "really" there to be seen by anyone who can 
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see, independently of beliefs or expectations. So it is not a mental affair. But 
"physical affair" won't do here either, since the field of the phenomenal 
objects of such seeing has a sort of intersubjective autonomy that is nicely 
accommodated in plain talk about them, without logical commitment to 
physicalism, in so far as this involves theoretical constructs of physics. The 
physicalistic consideration and its special talk ensues after our awareness of 
the phenomenon as an intentional object, i.e,, the sophisticated awareness of 
it as a physical somewhat inexistentially present. Only then does the theoret- 
ical consciousness of it grow-the sense that, in simply seeing the phenomenon 
in real space, we are seeing what isn't there, now meaning not in physical 
space. 
In this last step, I shall suggest something that points at-if it does not 
give-the answer to the question that has bedevilled current physicalists 
(Davidson, for example): why is there people-in-action (or person) talk at 
all, or what grounds it, if anything? Why not just physicalistic talk about what 
exists, namely, bodies-in-motion? Well, consider the odd ring of the remark, 
"the grieving woman is a conglomeration of atoms." You felt no such jolt 
under exposure to the notion that the white disk is a cluster of that sort. Why 
the difference, especially in view of the fact that you do not want simply to 
deny either proposition? Part of the answer draws attention to the "firstness" 
of what I have called the simple "realities" perceptually encountered in the 
reaI space (field of experience) in which we live, move, and have our being, 
with theories coming and going at the fringe. I called these "phenomena" 
and "intentional objects" not to derogate their reality or thinghood, but 
because they induce people (language-users), looking at them, to want the 
sort of explanations of them that only theorizing will yield, or in that light, 
to see them as objects manquC, not quite "actually" there where simply seen. 
Remember, nothing given exists. 
This characteristic is what one would expect of things in a field of con- 
sciousness, but it is crucial to remember that this visual field-as such not 
relativized by mental perspectives-is the public domain, the one world, of 
seers and of the things they simply see, and live with and talk about, simply. 
One is present in this domain thanks simply to being a living thing (= with 
a nervous system) with eyes alerted by the things around it in the field of 
ilIumination. This '"eal" world is the neutral, naturaI starting point for ven- 
tures beyond this matrix situation in search of theoretical explanations. 
Theoretical explanations naturally go in different directions-or are of 
logically different orders. If the thing in question is the white disk, its motion 
and stuff, the theoretical account raising and answering questions of what 
I have called "physicaI actuality" is proper. That is, "physical" analysis-call 
it substance analysis if you like-yields the theory with its theoretical con- 
structs dealing with items in physical space, not simply in view. Of such things. 
inexistentially present in the visual field, I said earlier that looking at and 
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seeing them "does" nothing to them, while their illumination does awaken 
the seer (turns him on) to their presence. 
But, if it is instead a woman you look at and see, this is certainly to do 
to her, provided, say, your glances meet. It makes her blush, for 
example-which is to change the color of something just by looking at it. The 
theoretical account of such phenomena will border on the absurd if it is given 
in terms of photons, neurons, and the like, Physical or substance analysis here 
is inappropriate, out of order. This is to say that the thing, qua live woman, 
is not "actually" a concourse of atoms or, more generally, not a "physical 
object" constituted and moving in the way that such a categorization requires. 
What she "actually" is will be stated, not in terms of substance or stuff anal- 
ysis, but in terms of ideas, ideals, emotions, cultural ethos, and so on. Call 
this "person" talk, including its ascriptive and normative force, the sort of 
talk that introduces the concept of a person to explain what one simply sees 
in some cases. (I do not like to call it '~sychological" language, tout court; 
language of "mind" is better.) Thus, what is "inexistentially present" in the 
blushing woman you simply see are norms of conduct, etc., the instantiation 
of which in behavior is action, not just motion. This is to say that even the 
concept of "body" in, say, "her body," is not quite what it is in, say, "the 
chemistry of his body." Looking at the bIushing woman, one can't naturally 
say, "she is a conglomeration of atoms," or even that her body is, ifthe point 
is to say something that has any explanatory bearing at all on the woman's 
face turning red. Her face, in the relevant sense, is the thing which shows 
you what she feels and thinks (embarrassment, shame, etc.), and the theoret- 
ical explanation of that is in terms of body-as-subject, not as physical object. 
In short, m-predicates functioning in person-talk (red face) are not quite the 
m-predicates of physicalistic talk. Strawson did not make enough of this 
difference. (However, at the starting point in plain talk, this difference be- 
tween m- and p-predicates is not operative.) 
But I concede to the physicalists that this is not substance analysis. Mind 
is not a substance, nor is a man alive as such a stuff, a substance. That the 
physical account or theory is somehow basic for the explanation of everything 
is the bogus notion of the philosopher who has overlooked the simple reality 
of things at the starting point, with their "firstness" that accommodates-even 
requires-the personalistic explanation of things like people. What is wanting 
is, thus, a true "First Philosophy" of the condition of things at the starting 
point where, as simply seen, they are not either physical or mental. They are 
intentional objects of sight, "intending" or "inexistentially presenting" what 
actually exists. And, in terms of this, there is no monolithic theory or explana- 
tion, all of the same logical type. Any "body" does indeed, as such, come 
under the category of "physical object," but if it is "somebody," the very body 
in question is appropriated and formed by principles that constitute it a 
body-as-subject, a person. 
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